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Abstract 
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However, due to the concerns about information leakage to industry rivals through M&A advisors, 
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I. Introduction 
A major source of revenue for investment banks comes from the provision of corporate mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A hereafter) advisory services.1   According to Golubov, Petmezas, and 
Travlos (2012), financial advisors were involved in global merger transactions worth around $4.2 
trillion in 2007 (representing more than 85% of all transactions by value) and the provision of these 
services earned the investment banks advisory fees of about $40 billion.  Given the economic 
magnitude and rapidly evolving nature of merger advisory business, there has been an increasing 
effort by academic researchers to identify the key driving forces behind the advisor-firm 
relationship.  Among others, financial advisor reputation, acquirer experience, deal complexity, 
and target business structure have been shown by prior studies to be the important factors for firms 
in M&A when choosing their financial advisors.2     
In this paper, we examine the economic causes and implications of choosing merger 
advisors.  In particular, we focus on the aspects that have been largely underexplored in prior 
studies - namely the advisor’s industry expertise and the firm’s concerns about information leakage 
to their product-market rivals through M&A advisors.   
In M&A investment banks advise acquiring and target firms by evaluating firms’ assets and 
providing technical and tactical assistance throughout the takeover process (Bodnaruk, Massa, and 
Simonov, 2009).  Through repeated participation in M&A transactions in a certain industry, 
advisors can accumulate industry-specific merger expertise that enables them to better assess firm 
value and synergies, execute complex deals, and reduce transaction costs.  Moreover, by advising 
different firms in an industry and employing experienced industry analysts, advisors can become 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, we use the terms mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, and M&A interchangeably. We also use 
the terms advisor, financial advisor, bank, and investment bank interchangeably. 
2 See among others, Servaes and Zenner (1996), Rau (2000), and Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003). 
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privy to crucial legal and regulatory issues, important industry developments, and firm-level 
information, so that they can leverage their domain expertise to provide tailored advisory service 
for firms in the industry.  When choosing advisors amongst all candidate banks, firms in M&A 
may therefore attach importance to a bank’s expertise in industries that are of interest to them.  
Although Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2002) have documented some causal evidence that 
banks use their industry expertise to develop unique underwriting capacity in certain industries, the 
effects of banks’ industry expertise on advisor choice and merger outcomes have been largely 
remained unexplored.3  In addition, as a merger transaction involves both an acquirer and a target, 
it is an empirical question whether the two firms value industry expertise differently.   
On the other hand, advisors’ industry expertise may also heighten firms’ concerns about 
leakage of sensitive information to industry (product-market) rivals. 4   A firm’s strategically 
sensitive information (e.g. operational efficiency, customer/supplier relationships, progress on 
research and development projects etc.) is amongst its most valuable intangible assets.  Investment 
banks can gain access to the sensitive information through due diligence undertaken before the 
execution of a deal and/or information certification when selling securities to investors.  Leaking 
firm-specific value-relevant information to a product-market rival is detrimental and such a concern 
may inhibit sharing of advisors between firms in an industry.  In general, large firms that have 
significant market shares and can affect the market equilibrium should be more sensitive to the 
effects of information leakage than small firms (Asker and Ljungqvist, 2010).  Therefore, they 
should be more willing to protect private information and inhibit information leakage to rival firms 
                                                 
3 For instance, in context of IPOs, Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2002) find that, of the 15 IPOs completed 
between 1990 and 1994 in the trucking industry, 9 were lead-managed by one bank (Alex. Brown), suggesting that 
banks’ industry expertise influences the likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates. 
4See Rajan and Zingales (2001), and Zabojnik (2002), and Baccara and Razin (2004) for analyses on the information 
leakage concern in situations where the crucial information is leaked outside of a firm through its current or former 
employees. 
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through M&A advisors.  In addition, the concerns about information leakage to industry rivals may 
also vary between acquirers and targets.   Target firms normally cease to exist as standalone 
companies if the mergers succeed, whilst acquiring firms continue competing against their rivals 
in product markets after acquisitions.  This implies that other things being equal, acquirers should 
be more concerned about information leakage than target firms when selecting M&A advisors.   
Taken together, we conjecture that a bank’s industry expertise has both positive and 
negative effects on firms’ choice of M&A advisors.  On one hand, a bank’s strong industry 
expertise can enable it to efficiently collect and process information in the industry, effectively 
facilitate deals, reduce transaction costs, and develop unique capacity in the industry.  On the other 
hand, its potential clients may be concerned about the likelihood of it (the bank) leaking sensitive 
information to product market rivals.  As a result, firms in M&A may trade off advisors’ industry 
expertise garnered from dealing with industry peers against the chance that advisors may leak 
sensitive information to firms’ product-market competitors. 
Against this background, we examine how investment banks are chosen as merger financial 
advisors for a sample of 12,996 mergers announced between 1985 and 2008.  We utilize the 
conditional logit model of McFadden (1973) and Morrison et al. (2013) to examine jointly the 
effects of banks’ industry merger expertise and firms’ concern about information leakage on the 
banks’ likelihood of being chosen for a transaction, while controlling for prior bank-firm 
relationships, banks’ market share and other bank-specific characteristics.  Our empirical models 
examine advisor choices of both acquirers and targets.  This setup recognizes that although all firms 
involved in a merger may consider similar factors in choosing an advisor, the influence of these 
factors on advisor choice may be different for acquirers and targets. 
Our results show that banks’ expertise in both firms’ own industries and their counterparties’ 
industries – when measured as prior merger advisory experience in those industries – are strong 
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determinants of advisor choice for firms in M&A.  In addition, we find that the impact of banks’ 
industry expertise on advisor choice is contingent on the nature of deal provisions.  Specifically, 
banks’ industry merger expertise becomes more important for advisor choice when firms in M&A 
have less information about the counterparties as characterized by higher R&D, a higher fraction 
of intangible assets, and a higher Tobin’s Q.  Banks’ industry expertise is also more important in 
more complicated transactions, such as mergers of equals and mergers with termination fee 
provisions. Additionally, the existence of poison pills in targets’ corporate charters also makes 
banks’ industry expertise more valuable to acquirers.  
 Furthermore, consistent with our prediction that firms may avoid sharing investment banks 
with major product-market rivals, a bank is less likely to be chosen by a firm if it (the bank) has 
had a past relationship with the firm’s major product-market rivals.  To further investigate firms’ 
concerns about information leakage to product-market rivals, we study the advisor switching 
decision in consecutive M&A transactions for both acquirers and targets.  Our results indicate that 
acquirers and targets exhibit different switching behaviours – acquirers are more likely to switch 
advisors because of the concern about information leakage to product-market rivals, whereas 
targets’ switching decisions are unaffected by advisors’ past relationship with their major product-
market rivals, supporting our conjecture that acquirers are more concerned about information 
leakage than target firms when selecting M&A advisors.   
We then examine whether advisors’ industry expertise affects the price and quality of their 
services.  We find that acquirers’ (targets’) advisory fees are positively related to banks’ expertise 
in acquirers’ (targets’) industries, implying that firms pay premium fees for services provided by 
advisors with industry experience.  Do advisors with stronger industry expertise charge higher fees 
because they provide higher-quality services?  To answer this question, we study the impact of 
advisors’ industry expertise on various merger outcomes.  To the extent that advisors’ industry 
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expertise enhances advisors’ ability to structure mergers with higher synergies or improve firms’ 
bargaining power in negotiations, advisors’ industry expertise should be positively related to 
shareholders’ value in firms hiring the advisors.  Furthermore, if advisors with industry merger 
experience are hired by firms to facilitate and complete the deal, this should be positively related 
to the likelihood of deal completion. 
We find no evidence that advisors’ industry expertise affects shareholders’ value in 
acquiring and target firms, in terms of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the merger 
announcement date, merger premium, and acquirers’ post-merger stock returns.  However, we do 
find that acquirers’ advisors with stronger expertise in acquirers’ and targets’ industries are more 
likely to complete the transactions that they handle.  These results are consistent with Rau (2000) 
who shows that deal valuation is of secondary importance for advisors because they generally have 
strong deal completion incentives and their objective is simply to close the deal.   
Our contribution to the literature is threefold.  First, we identify advisors’ industry-specific 
merger experience and firms’ concern about information leakage to industry rivals as new factors 
influencing advisor choice in M&A.  In addition, we show that the impact of industry expertise on 
advisor choice is contingent on information asymmetry between the acquirers and targets and on 
deal complexity.  Second, consistent with Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) who demonstrate that firms 
are reluctant to share underwriters in debt and equity issuance, our results suggest that in the context 
of M&A, merger parties, particularly acquirers, avoid sharing financial advisors with their product-
market rivals.  This finding sheds light on how investment banks compete for M&A advisory 
services.  Third, we show that merger parties pay higher fees to advisors with stronger industry 
expertise, indicating that it makes economic sense for investment banks to build up and protect 
their industry expertise.  In return for premium fees, advisors with stronger industry merger 
expertise increase the likelihood of deal completion. 
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Our work is related to several papers studying how M&A expertise or experience affects 
M&A outcomes. Mkrtchyan (2012) shows that directors’ past acquisition experience is associated 
with higher announcement returns.  Bao and Edmans (2011) identify a significant investment-bank 
fixed effect in M&A returns and show that advisors’ past performance affects M&A outcomes.  
Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) study the relation between individual investment bankers and 
acquisition outcomes.  Lastly, Song, Wei, and Zhou (2013) document that the expertise of boutique 
advisors benefits acquirers’ shareholders.  In this paper we focus on advisors’ merger expertise 
developed in an industry and examine whether it affects firms’ advisor choice and merger outcomes. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II briefly reviews the relevant literature 
and develops our hypotheses.  Section III describes our sample, variable construction, and the 
empirical methodologies.  Main results and robustness checks are presented in Section IV. Section 
V concludes.  
 
II. Hypothesis Development 
A. Industry Expertise, Information Leakage to Product-Market Rivals and the Choice of 
Financial Advisor 
Financial advisors are thought to perform at least two important functions during a takeover 
(McLaughlin, 1990, 1992).  First, they help their clients in identifying better mergers – mergers 
that are expected to result in high synergies, and propose mechanisms that allow the realization of 
these synergies once the merger is consummated.  Second, they advise clients on strategic actions 
that may relate to the bid itself (designing the actual offer, bidding strategies etc.), and on actions 
to counteract any moves undertaken by merger counterparties and product-market competitors.  By 
assisting different firms in an industry for M&A, advisors can build industry-specific merger 
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expertise and develop unique advisory capacity in the industry.  They can also enjoy a lower cost 
of producing industry-wide information by bundling deals in the same industry (Benveniste, 
Busaba, and Wilhelm, 2002).  Additionally, advisors specializing in a certain industry may achieve 
information advantage through past transactions and the research performed by experienced 
industry research analysts (Kadan et al., 2012).  Collectively, advisors’ industry expertise should 
enhance their ability to value firms in acquisitions, lower the transaction costs, and improve their 
skills in executing the transactions.  Thus, firms in M&A should consider advisors’ prior merger 
experience in an industry or a product market that is of interest (to them) when choosing advisors.  
When mergers are diversifying (i.e., the acquiring and target firms are from different industries), 
managers should also consider advisors’ prior merger experience in the merger counterparties’ 
industries due to their information disadvantages in new industries.  Besides, diversifying mergers 
involve a higher degree of information asymmetry between merging firms and require quality 
advisory services.5  The preceding arguments form the basis for our ﬁrst two hypotheses, stated in 
the alternative form:  
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the probability of an advisor being chosen by a firm to advise on an acquisition 
increases with the advisor’s merger expertise in the firm’s own industry. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, for a diversifying merger, the probability of an advisor being chosen by a firm 
to advise on an acquisition increases with the advisor’s merger expertise in the merger 
counterparty’s industry. 
                                                 
5 For example, Coates (2012) finds that diversifying deals are more likely to include risk allocation provisions (RAP) 
than other deals.  One of the common examples of RAP is the cap and floor embedded in the offer price of a stock 
merger.  Similarly, Macias and Moeller (2013) find that diversifying mergers have broader firm-specific abandonment 
options provided by the Material Adverse Change (MAC) clause, which protects acquirers from events that lead to a 
significant reduction in targets’ value.  Custódio and Metzger (2013) documents that, in the diversifying takeovers, 
CEOs negotiate better deals if they have previous experiences in the target industries. 
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Firms’ demand for advisors’ industry expertise may vary across different types of 
transactions.  For instance, we expect the effect of industry expertise on advisor choice to be 
contingent on both the degree of information asymmetry and the complexity of the transaction.  
For instance, Servaes and Zenner (1996) document that deal complexity increases the likelihood 
of an investment bank being used for a particular transaction.  They also suggest that a transaction 
is more complex if the acquirer and the target are of comparable size.  An acquirer may not count 
on advisors’ industry expertise much if the target firm is relatively small.   
Additionally, firms’ demand for advisors’ industry expertise should be higher when the 
merging firms have less information about each other.6  Through frequent participation in mergers 
in an industry, advisors can spread the cost of producing information across transactions and 
alleviate their clients’ information disadvantage.  We also expect advisors’ industry expertise to be 
important in mergers where termination fees are present and anti-takeover devices are in place.  A 
termination fee is a contingent payment made by a firm in M&A to another if the former dissolves 
the merger agreement.  Servaes and Zenner (1996) suggest that a transaction is more complex if 
risk management devices are used.  Bates and Lemmon (2003) find that target termination fee can 
increase the probability of deal completion and is more likely to exist in deals involving assets with 
higher growth opportunities, and that acquirer termination fee is more likely to exist in transactions 
where the costs of negotiation are high.  In other words, termination fees can resolve a part of the 
contracting problems between the acquirer and the target (Officer, 2003), and they are particularly 
important for transactions that involve greater negotiation effort and strategically important assets.7  
                                                 
6 We thank the editor for suggesting that the information asymmetry between merging firms affects the importance of 
advisors’ industry expertise. 
7 Officer (2003) shows that termination fee agreements significantly affect shareholder wealth and interests.  As the 
inclusion of such provisions necessarily indicates increasing deal complexity, it may also influence the advisor choice. 
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The existence of anti-takeover devices may also increase the difficulties in and the time for 
negotiation.  Poison pill is one of the commonly used anti-takeover devices as it gives a firm’s 
current shareholders the right to buy shares at a discount if an investor buys a certain percentage 
of the firm’s shares.  It is a strategy used by firms to discourage hostile takeovers by making 
themselves less attractive to potential bidders.  Heron and Lie (2006) find that poison pills increase 
takeover premium through increasing target firms’ bargaining power in merger negotiations.  
Motivated by the above arguments, we hypothesize that all else equal, 
 
H3: Firms are more likely to select advisors with merger expertise in their own and merger 
counterparties’ industries when acquiring and target firms are of similar size, when the information 
asymmetry between merger parties is more severe, and when the transaction involves termination 
fee agreements or poison pills.   
   
Industry expertise inevitably comes with the potential threat of leaking sensitive firm-
specific information to outsiders.  It is reasonable to assume that such information is most useful 
to a firm’s direct competitors and that the likelihood of such leakage increases after the firm-bank 
relationship is terminated.  Further, the threat of leakage exists in both directions – the advisor may 
leak information about its other clients (who are the source of its industry expertise) to the new 
client or it may leak new client-related information to other firms.8  Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) 
examine the influence of potential information leakage on firms’ sharing underwriters with 
competitors and on the extent of competition amongst banks providing underwriting services.  
                                                 
8 Anand and Galetovic (2000), Azoulay (2004), and Baccara (2007) examine various aspects of information leakage.  
Benveniste et al. (2003) document that information spillovers do exist in underwriting services.  In particular, they find 
that valuation of an IPO is affected by the valuation of contemporaneous IPOs in the same industry. 
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Their analysis suggests that the possible cost (leaking sensitive information to competitors) of 
information leakage outweighs the potential gain (gaining sensitive information about competitors).   
Specifically, they show that firms’ concerns about informational frictions make them reluctant to 
share a bank with major product-market rivals and that these issues pose an endogenous limit on 
banks’ market power.   
Arguably, concerns regarding information leakage may be even more pronounced around 
a merger as banks simultaneously manage multiple facets of the transaction such as raising capital 
to finance transactions, negotiating buyer, supplier, and employee relationships, and implementing 
integration strategies.  Under such circumstances the “loss” due to information leakage may be 
substantial.  We therefore propose that concerns regarding information leakage may also exert 
significant influence on how financial advisors are chosen by the merger parties in a merger 
transaction. 
The preceding discussion suggests that the likelihood of an investment bank winning the 
merger advisory mandate may be positively influenced by its industry-specific experience but 
negatively influenced by its current clients’ desire to inhibit information leakage to their product-
market competitors.  The significance of the information flow depends on the position of the firm 
in the industry.  In general, leading large firms in an industry are expected to be more concerned 
about information leakage than smaller firms because they have more strategic options that are 
vulnerable to information leakage (Asker and Ljungqvist, 2010).  We thus expect acquirers to be 
more concerned with information leakage than targets because acquirers are generally much larger 
than targets and because typically, on completion of the deals, targets may cease to exist.  In the 
same vein, compared with target firms, acquirers are expected to be more likely to switch their 
advisors for a new transaction if their advisors have relationships with other leading (large) firms 
in the industry.  The above discussions lead to the following hypothesis: 
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H4: The probability of a bank being chosen by an acquirer is lower if the bank has also advised the 
acquirer’s major industry rivals.  Besides, an acquirer is more likely to switch away from an advisor 
that advised past deals if the advisor also advised M&A transactions of the firm’s major industry 
rivals.   
 
B. The Effects of Industry Expertise on the Price and Quality of Advisory Services 
M&A advisory fees serve as a major source of revenue for investment banks (Kolasinski 
and Kothari, 2008), it is thus interesting to investigate whether advisors’ industry expertise is 
rewarded by a higher price of their services in M&As.  The impact of banks’ industry expertise on 
advisory fees is unclear ex ante.  One may expect that a bank’s industry expertise allows it to 
command a higher fee from the merging firms for providing superior services.  On the other hand, 
industry experience may be associated with a lower advisory fee as the expertise (achieved through 
past transactions) may lower advisors’ marginal costs of information production.  It is an empirical 
question as to which view is more dominant.  Thus, we propose the following hypothesis for merger 
advisory fee:   
 
H5: Merger advisory fee is positively related to advisors’ industry expertise.   
 
We investigate two main views on the effects of advisors’ industry expertise on the quality 
of advisory services.  Advisors with superior industry merger expertise may lead to better matches 
and thus creation of higher synergies.  We refer to this possibility as the “value enhancement” view.  
This view predicts that advisors’ rich industry expertise results in value-enhancing deals for firms, 
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which would be evident by higher announcement-period excess returns and superior post-merger 
performance.  
On the other hand, more experienced advisors could be hired simply to complete M&A 
transactions without creating any material value effects for shareholders.  We term this as the “deal 
completion” view.  This view predicts that advisors’ industry expertise should be positively 
associated with the likelihood of deal completion, but is not necessarily significantly related to 
shareholder value in acquisitions.  This view is also examined by Rau (2000) who finds that 
investment banks focus on completing the deal because of the contingent structure of advisory fee, 
rather than enhancing shareholders’ value for firms hiring them in acquisitions.  Following the 
above arguments, we hypothesize that: 
 
H6: Advisors’ industry expertise is positively associated with merger announcement returns and 
post-merger performance.  
H7: Advisors’ industry expertise is positively associated with the probability of deal completion. 
 
III. Data and Variables 
A. Sample and Data 
We begin by outlining the steps followed to construct the set of candidate advisors (banks) 
used in the study.  We collect the advisor information from SDC/Platinum and select sample banks 
by forming a union of two groups of banks: (1) the sample of Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm 
(2006); and (2) the sample of 50 most active banks in M&A activities by transaction value over the 
period January 1985 to December 2008. As SDC/Platinum sometimes reports multiple codes for 
the same bank, we manually check these codes and combine them into a single code if they belong 
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to the same bank.  To account for major bank mergers during the study period, we utilize the data 
provided in Corwin and Schultz (2005) and Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006), and the data 
supplemented by SDC/Platinum and other financial news sources.  Appendix A lists the final set 
of survival banks, together with their predecessors, during the sample period.  The number of 
candidate banks varies from 57 to 107 over time, depending on past mergers and the date a bank 
first appears in SDC Mergers and Acquisitions. 
Our primary merger sample obtained from SDC M&A database includes mergers and 
acquisitions between U.S. firms between January 1985 and December 2008. We only include deals 
that are either completed or withdrawn, and we exclude “buybacks”, “exchange offers”, and 
“recapitalizations” as indicated by the SDC, and privatizations in which acquirers and targets have 
the same CUSIP.  We require both the acquirer and target have available SIC codes and require 
that acquirers own less than 50% of targets’ shares before the announcement date and controls 100% 
of targets’ shares after acquisition.   We exclude deals that are worth less than $1 million or less 
than 1% of the acquiring firm’s market value of equity. Also excluded are transactions with no deal 
value disclosed.  Finally, we eliminate deals in which neither the acquirer nor the target appoints 
an advisor in appendix A.  Our final sample consists of 12,996 mergers and acquisitions.  Financial 
data is obtained from Compustat Industrial Annual database. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics about various firm and deal characteristics.  About 32.0% 
of the transactions are pure-cash deals, 25.1% of the transactions are pure-stock deals, and the rest 
are others including cash-and-stock mix.  A vast majority of transactions (95.7%) are classified as 
“friendly” by the SDC.  Further, about 88.2% of the acquirers and 47.1% of the targets are publicly 
listed.  To classify an acquisition as horizontal or diversifying, we compare the primary industry 
four-digit SIC codes of the acquirer and the target.  An acquisition is classified as horizontal if the 
acquirer and target share the same four-digit SIC code.  As a result, about 33.7% of the transactions 
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are classified as horizontal mergers, and the rest are classified as diversifying mergers.  Finally, 
Table 1 also reports that 62.7% of acquirers and 81.4% of targets hire at least one financial advisor. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for market shares of the twenty five most active 
financial advisors in our sample. We rank them based on the total value of all transactions (column 
1) advised by the surviving bank and its predecessors. Column (3) reports the total number of 
transactions.  If there are multiple advisors for an acquirer (target) in a merger, each advisor is 
allocated a 1/n share of value in column (1) or a count of 1/n in column (3), where n is the number 
of advisors for a transaction.  Column 1 suggests that Goldman Sachs is the most active M&A 
advisor based on the total value of transactions advised over the period 1985-2008, followed by 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley.  Following Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 
(2012), we refer to the top eight investment banks as top-tier, and all other advisors as non-top-
tier.9    
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
B. Variables 
Bank’s industry expertise.  As the key variable of our interest, bank’s industry expertise is 
set equal to the number of mergers advised by a bank for a firm’s four-digit SIC industry divided 
by the total number of mergers in the industry during the past five years.  This definition is similar 
to that of Asker and Ljungqvist (2010).  By construction, it takes a value between zero and one.  If 
                                                 
9 Note that the ranking reported in Table 2 may be different from that given by the SDC league tables because when 
calculating the number of deals advised by an advisor, we include all deals advised by the bank and its predecessors. 
In addition, the top eight investment banks are slightly different from those of Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012).  
Lazard and UBS rank number 8 and 9 in their Table I, but rank number 9 and 8, respectively, in our sample.  The 
discrepancy is caused by the difference in sample period between theirs (1996-2009) and ours (1985-2008). 
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there was no merger in the industry over the past five years, all banks are assigned a value zero for 
industry expertise.   
Bank’s expertise in merger counterparty’s industry.  The variable is defined similarly as 
Bank’s industry expertise.  However, as the acquirer’s and target’s industry are the same in 
horizontal mergers, we set this variable to zero in horizontal mergers to avoid double counting the 
effect banks’ industry expertise in horizontal mergers.  For this purpose, we interact Bank’s 
expertise in merger counterparty’s industry with a dummy variable (Diversifying) that equals one 
for diversifying mergers, and zero otherwise. An acquisition is defined as a diversifying one if the 
acquirer and target have different 4-digit SIC codes. 
Bank-industry rival relationship.  To capture the concern of information leakage to industry 
rivals, we follow Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) and construct a bank-industry rival relationship 
variable, which is defined as the number of deals advised by a bank for largest three firms in the 
firm’s four-digit SIC industry (excluding the firm itself if it is among top three) divided by the total 
number of advised deals in the firm’s industry during the past 5 years.  The three largest firms are 
defined using net sales in Compustat in the calendar year of the merger announcement.  By 
construction, this variable is positively related to the measure of industry expertise defined above 
since both variables are based on banks’ advisory experiences with firms in the same industry.  
Untabulated results show that the correlation coefficients between the bank-industry rival 
relationship and industry expertise is 0.37 for acquirers and 0.36 for targets, both significant at the 
1% level.  However, the bank-industry rival relationship variable is designed to capture the specific 
industry experience garnered from dealing with the firm’s major industry rivals. 
Control Variables.  We consider the following control variables when examining firms’ 
decision to choose or switch financial advisors in M&As.  Prior studies have documented that the 
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bank-firm prior relationship increases the likelihood of a bank winning an underwriting mandate.10  
James (1992) finds that the marginal cost of the repeated underwriting business with the same firm 
is lower.  We thus expect that other things being equal, firms tend to stick with their previous 
advisors in M&As.  We construct a proxy for prior bank-firm relationship based on the past merger 
advisory activities.  Specifically, each firm’s six-digit CUSIP and its SDC M&A advisor code is 
matched with M&A advisory mandates in the last five years to determine if a prior relationship 
exists.  The bank-firm prior relationship is then defined as the number of mergers advised by a 
bank for a firm divided by the total number of mergers done by the firm during the past five years.  
If a firm was not involved in any mergers over the past five years, all banks are assigned a value 
of zero for the bank-firm prior relationship. 
Furthermore, we include several other control variables that have been shown by previous 
studies to affect advisor choices.  First, Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) use bank’s market share as a 
proxy for advisor’s reputation in providing advisory services and predict the advisor choice in 
M&As.  We define a bank’s market share as the fraction of total transactions that have been advised 
by the candidate bank in the previous calendar year.11  Second, a bank is unlikely to advise a merger 
whereby the transaction value is either unusually large or unusually small relative to its average 
deal size over the sample period.12  Therefore, we use the variable, relative transaction size, to 
capture the absolute difference between the current transaction value and the average transaction 
value advised by a bank during the past five years.   
                                                 
10 Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006, 2009) examine U.S. debt and equity offerings completed between 1993 
and 2002 for prior bank-firm relationships, and conclude that prior underwriting relationships increase the likelihood 
of winning a lead-underwriting mandate. 
11 More specifically, a bank’s market share in mergers is defined as the number of mergers advised by the bank divided 
by the total number of mergers in previous calendar year.  Similar results are obtained if we define market share using 
the transaction values rather than the number of transactions.  We define a bank’s market share over one year instead 
of five years following Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) who use market share defined over a short period (1-year) to 
predict the advisor choice.   
12 Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) make a similar argument in their analysis of underwriter choices in securities offerings.  
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IV. Results 
A.  The Conditional Logit Model for the Advisor Choice 
  We follow McFadden (1973) and Morrison et al. (2013) and employ a conditional logit 
model in which firms select merger advisors from amongst all possible competing banks based on 
advisor-specific attributes.13  To be more specific, each firm k (acquirer or target) is modelled as 
having a utility function as follows. 
    ,kjt kjt kjtu Y        
(1) 
where Ykjt is a set of bank-specific variables of interest, including industry expertise and the bank-
industry rival relationship.  εkjt are independent Type I extreme-value random variables.  Given this 
utility function, each firm chooses the advisor that maximizes its utility.  The probability that a 
bank j advises a firm k at time t is modelled as,   
  
 
1
exp( )
exp( ( ))
   
kjt
J
kjtj
Prob bank j advises firm k at time t
Y
Y





,  (2) 
where the dependent variable takes a value of one if a bank is chosen to advise the acquirer (or the 
target) of a particular M&A deal,  and zero otherwise.14  For each transaction, we include in the 
choice set all available advisors and create all possible pairs for each firm (acquirer or target) and 
advisors, resulting in 553,487 acquirer-advisor pairs and 707,841 target-advisor pairs. 
                                                 
13The conditional logit model differs from regular probit/logit regressions in that the data are grouped by M&A 
transactions and the likelihood is computed relative to each group; that is, a conditional likelihood is calculated.  The 
model has a similar effect to including individual fixed effects.  We are grateful to the anonymous referee for suggesting 
the use and the advantages of the conditional logit model.   Our main results are qualitatively the same if advisor choice 
is estimated using the probit model of Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006). 
14 A potential problem for advisor choice is that the unconditional probability of being selected as a financial advisor 
of a merger is low (around 1%).  In other words, being selected is a rare event.  King and Zeng (2001) argue that the 
use of traditional binary choices models will underestimate the probability of rare events.  To correct for the bias, we 
use the rare event Logistic Regression developed by King and Zeng (2001) to re-estimate the regressions for Table 3 
and Table 4 and find that our results are essentially the same.   
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 presents the advisor-choice results for acquirers and targets.  In the acquirer’s 
(target’s) advisor choice model, only transactions in which the acquirer (target) uses at least one 
advisor are included.  This results in 7,797 (10,033) transactions and 553,487 (707,841) acquirer 
(target)-advisor pairs for the acquirer (target) advisor choice model.  Consistent with hypotheses 
H1 and H2, columns 1 and 2 indicate that banks’ merger expertise in relevant industries influences 
their likelihood of being awarded the advisory mandate, with all four estimated coefficients being 
positive and significant at the 1% level in both columns.  The economic magnitude is such that the 
odds of a bank being chosen as an advisor by an acquirer/target would increase by 0.608/0.653 
times if prior industry expertise in the acquirer’s/target’s industry increases by one standard 
deviation (0.098).15  Similarly, the odds of a bank being chosen as an advisor by an acquirer/a target 
would increase by 0.283/0.409 times if prior industry expertise in the merger counterparty’s 
industry increases by one standard deviation. Consistent with hypothesis H4 that the concerns about 
information leakage to product-market rivals negatively affects the advisor choice, the negative 
and significant coefficients of the bank-industry rival relationship in columns 1 and 2 indicate that 
firms avoid sharing financial advisors with product-market rivals.  Other things being equal, if a 
bank’s prior relationship with product-market rivals increases by one standard deviation (0.027), 
the odds of being chosen by the acquirer/target is reduced by 0.066/0.072 times. 
The positive coefficients of bank-firm prior relationship in columns 1 and 2 suggest that 
firms tend to engage in repeated relationships with banks over time.  Consistent with Kale, Kini, 
and Ryan (2003), we document that a bank’s market share increases its likelihood of being chosen.  
                                                 
15 In a conditional logit model, the proportional impact of an increase of y for a variable Y on the odds of a positive 
outcome is estimated as exp(α×y) – 1, where α is the coefficient of Y in the model. As the coefficient of Bank’s industry 
expertise in model (1) is 4.85, the impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in Bank’s industry expertise on the odds 
of a bank being chosen by the acquirer is exp(0.098×4.85) – 1 = 0.608. 
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In addition, negative coefficients of relative transaction size suggests that banks are less likely to 
advise clients (especially target firms) on mergers if the transaction value deviates drastically from 
the average size of deals advised in the past.   
In a robustness check (unreported), we re-run the model using a subset of firms that choose 
non-top-tier advisors.  We examine this subset of firms to mitigate the concern of potential reverse 
causality: experienced banks select their clients rather than firms choosing their advisors.  The top-
tier advisors are the eight advisors identified in Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012).  We focus 
on non-top-tier banks for this test because they have weaker market power, are less likely to select 
clients, and are thus less subject to the reverse causality concern.    The results (untabulated) 
obtained from excluding top-tier banks are qualitatively similar to those obtained using the full 
sample.16  
The effect of industry expertise may not be equally important for all transactions.  
Hypothesis H3 suggests that the effect of industry expertise on advisor choice is contingent on the 
degree of information asymmetry and the complexity of the transaction.  To test this hypothesis 
H3, we estimate the augmented conditional logit model as follows.  
 
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,  (3) 
where Z is one of deal-specific variables that are constant across all firm-bank pairs for each deal 
(transaction).  We interact deal-specific variables with our key variables of interest (Y) to capture 
the contingent effects.  
The deal-specific variables include: (1) a dummy variable for mergers-of-equals; (2) the 
merger counterparty’s intangible assets divided by total assets; (3) the merger counterparty’s R&D 
                                                 
16 We acknowledge, however, that this test cannot completely rule out reverse causality, although it can partly alleviate 
the concern. 
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intensity defined as R&D expenses divided by total assets; (4) the merger counterparty’s Tobin’s 
Q; (5) a dummy variable for poison pills in place for the target firm; and (6) a dummy variable for 
the termination fee provision in the merger agreement. The dummy for mergers-of-equals is 
included to account for the possibility that a transaction is more complicated in a merger-of-equals 
where the acquirer and the target are similar in size than transactions with target firms being much 
smaller than acquirers.17 Intangible assets, R&D intensity, and Tobin’s Q are proxies for the degree 
of information asymmetry about the merger counterparty.  It is generally believed that a firm is 
more difficult to value if it has significant growth opportunities and is heavily involved in R&D 
activities.  Finally, a transaction is considered to be more complex when risk management clauses 
are included or when the target has poison pills in place that increase its bargaining power.  In 
general, we expect these factors to affect firms’ reliance on banks’ industry expertise when 
selecting advisors. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results from the regressions for the advisor choice of 
acquirers.  The findings are generally consistent with hypothesis H3 that firms in M&A value 
advisors’ industry expertise in complex transactions.  Column 1 of Panel A shows that acquirers 
attach more value to advisors’ industry expertise in mergers-of-equals.  The impact of a one-
standard-deviation increase in industry expertise on the odds ratio of a bank being chosen as an 
acquirer’s advisor is 0.393 (= exp(3.38×0.098) – 1) times higher for mergers-of-equals than for 
other mergers.18 The finding is intuitive as, compared with cases where acquirers are significantly 
                                                 
17 As per SDC’s classification, merger-of-equals indicates deals that involve stock swaps, involve firms with similar 
market capitalization, and result in approximately equal ownership of the merged firm by acquirer and target 
shareholders. 
18 The coefficients of interaction terms in a non-linear model (such as Logit or Probit) warrant cautious interpretations. 
Ai and Norton (2003) show that the coefficient of an interaction term is not an accurate measure of the true interaction 
effect on the outcome probability. We thus interpret the interaction effect using odds ratios as Buis (2010) and 
Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) show that the interaction term is still relevant for measuring proportional marginal effects, 
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larger than targets, mergers-of-equals are generally more complicated as neither side possesses 
significant bargaining advantages and the post-merger integration may be more difficult.  Columns 
2 to 4 show that acquirers value advisors’ industry expertise more in mergers when targets exhibit 
higher  R&D intensity, have more intangible assets, and growth opportunities.  As those targets are 
generally more difficult to value, advisors’ industry expertise can help narrow the information gap 
between acquirers and targets.  Column 5 shows that the effect of advisors’ industry expertise is 
stronger for mergers with targets that have poison pills in place.  Poison pills typically enhance 
targets’ bargaining power, thus increasing the complexity of merger negotiations.  Finally, column 
6 shows that acquirers value advisors’ industry expertise more in mergers that include termination 
fee provisions.  Officer (2003) notes that termination fees help reduce the failure risk of an 
acquisition.  In particular, he argues that target termination fee can be used as devices to “efficiently 
solve contracting problems between the bidder and the target” by protecting “the deal-related 
investment made by the bidder”.  Our finding suggests that such complexity increases the need for 
industry expertise.  All the above findings hold for expertise not only in acquirers’ industries but 
also in targets’ industries.  For example, for mergers-of-equals, the impact of a one-standard-
deviation increase in targets’ industry expertise on the odds ratio of a bank being chosen is 2.52 (= 
exp(12.85×0.098) – 1) times higher than that of other mergers. Finally, the coefficients of control 
variables in Table 4 are qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 3. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results from regressions for the advisor choice of targets.  
The findings are consistent with those reported in Panel A, i.e., targets attach more value to advisors’ 
industry expertise in mergers-of-equals, mergers with targets that have growth opportunities, 
                                                 
i.e. the impact on odds ratios. We thank the editor for pointing out this empirical issue and helping us improve the 
interpretation of the empirical results. 
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mergers with targets that have poison pills in place, and mergers that include a clause of termination 
fee. 
Taken together, the results in Table 4 suggest that the effect of industry expertise on the 
advisor choice varies across firms for both acquirers and targets.  Firms tend to value banks’ 
industry expertise more in complicated transactions that require such banks to resolve contracting 
problems between the acquirers and targets.  We have also estimated models by including the 
interaction terms between our measure of information leakage concerns, Bank-industry rival 
relationship, and various deal characteristics (Z).  Results (untabulated) reveal that the interaction 
terms are statistically insignificant, implying that the negative effect of information leakage 
concerns on the advisor choice is insensitive to deal characteristics.  
 
B. Advisor Switching Decisions 
Our results so far suggest that banks’ industry merger expertise and concern about 
information leakage to industry rivals are important determinants of the advisor choice.  Further, 
the effect of industry expertise on the advisor choice is influenced by information asymmetry and 
deal complexity.  We now study the advisor switching decision in consecutive transactions for both 
acquirers and targets.  The model for advisor switching is different from the advisor choice model 
in at least two ways.  First, the switching model requires firms in consideration to have merger 
experience and is thus conditional on an established bank-firm relationship, whereas the advisor 
choice model is an unconditional model.  Thus, by construction, firms in the switching model are 
more experienced in M&As than those in the choice model.  Second, it focuses on a particular 
bank-firm link and tests whether a firm retains the existing advisor or switches to other banks, 
while the advisor choice model assumes that a firm chooses among all candidate banks.  
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To examine the advisor switching decision of a firm we exclude the first M&A transaction 
for every firm in the sample.  This reduces the numbers of observations for acquirers and targets 
to 2,231 and 920, respectively.  The probit model for the switching decision is written as follows. 
Prob (firm switches advisor at time t) =  f(a + bYkjt + cWkjt),   (4) 
where f is the cumulative normal distribution function, and the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm chooses a bank for the current deal that is different from the one 
in the most recent transaction.  We define a switch if a firm does not hire advisors from its most 
recent deal (or, if ex-advisors have been acquired, their successors).  If multiple advisors were hired 
in the previous deal, we define a switch if the firm does not retain every advisor from the previous 
deal (Asker and Ljungqvist, 2010).19  Ykjt includes Bank’s industry expertise, Bank’s expertise in 
merger counterparty’s industry × Diversifying, and bank-industry rival relationship.  Wkjt is a 
vector of other determinants of the advisor switching decision, as used by Asker and Ljungqvist 
(2010).  It includes bank-firm prior relationship, banks' overall market share, a loyalty measure that 
captures how often the bank retains its clients, and a bank-merger dummy indicating whether the 
previous financial advisor itself has been involved in any bank mergers since the previous deal.20  
It also includes the number of years since the previous transaction as a control variable, which is 
motivated by James (1992) who shows that the value of firm-specific information (in a bank-firm 
relationship) degrades over time, suggesting the likelihood of a firm switching advisors increases 
with the time elapsed since the last transaction.  
                                                 
19 The regression is not run on a transaction basis, instead, it is on a firm-bank pair basis.  Let us consider an example: 
A firm hires A, B, and C banks as advisors in the previous deal and the firm only retains bank A as the advisor in the 
current deal.  In switching regression, for the current deal, we actually have 3 observations: firm-bank A, firm-bank B, 
and firm-bank C.  The switching dummy is equal to 0 for firm-bank A, but 1 for firm-bank B and firm-bank C. 
20 Loyalty index measures how often an advisor retains its client firms in consecutive M&A deals.  Let Ick and Irk = 1 
if an advisor j advisor firm k’s penultimate and the most recent M&A transactions, respectively, in the past five years, 
and zero otherwise, then advisor j’s loyalty index is set equal to Σk (Ick× Irk) / Σk Ick , which represents the number of 
retained clients over the total number of clients. 
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
Column 1 of Table 5 reports the results obtained from estimating Equation (4) for acquirers.  
The coefficient of bank’s industry expertise is negative and significant at the 5% level, implying 
that advisors with expertise in the acquirers’ industries are more likely to be retained in future 
transactions.  The economic magnitude is such that a one-standard-deviation increase in industry 
expertise (0.098) is associated with a reduction of the odds for switching by 0.07 (= exp(-
0.74×0.098) – 1) times.  The coefficient of banks’ expertise in targets’ industries is also negative 
and significant at the 5% level.  That is, a bank is more likely to be retained by an acquirer in a 
diversifying merger if it also has merger expertise in the target’s industry. An increase in industry 
expertise in the target’s industry by one standard deviation (0.098) is associated with a reduction 
of the odds for switching by 0.124 times.  Furthermore, we find that an acquirer is more likely to 
switch from its former advisor if its former advisor had relationship with top three firms in the 
industry.  An increase in bank-industry rival relationship by one standard deviation (0.027) 
increases the odds for switching by about 0.194 times. These findings confirm the results 
documented in Table 3 that although firms value advisors’ industry expertise, they are also 
concerned about information leakage to industry rivals.   
The results for targets in column 2 of Table 5, however, suggest that banks’ industry 
expertise and firms’ concern about information leakage to industry rivals do not significantly affect 
the likelihood of targets switching advisors.  Experienced targets do not seem to ascribe much 
importance to banks’ industry expertise given that they are already “in play”, and perhaps because 
they have been on the other side of the table in past M&A transactions.  More importantly, two 
possible factors may contribute to the finding that targets are not concerned about information 
leakage to industry rivals.  First, targets are often smaller than acquirers.  As smaller firms are 
generally followers in an industry and have smaller market share and weaker pricing power, they 
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are less concerned about information leakage to industry rivals.  Second, on completion of the deals, 
targets may cease to exist, and as a result, target managers are less concerned about product-market 
competitions in the future.  Their advisor switching decision is thus less affected by the concern 
about information leakage.  
The coefficients of other explanatory variables in Table 5 are consistent with expectations.  
Switching is less likely if an advisor has stronger past relationship with the firm, stronger ability to 
retain clients (higher loyalty index), or a larger market share.  Consistent with James (1992), the 
more time has passed since acquirer’s most recent merger, the more likely that firm will switch 
advisors for the next transaction. 
 
C. Advisors’ Industry Expertise and Advisory Fees  
We have documented significant influence of advisors’ industry expertise on firms’ advisor 
choice in mergers and acquisitions.  In addition, our results also suggest that advisors’ merger 
experience with major industry rivals gives rise to information leakage concerns, which prevent 
firms from sharing advisors with competitors.  In this section, we explore the economic 
implications of banks’ industry expertise and information leakage concerns by examining their 
effects on M&A advisory fees.  
By measuring advisor reputation using a binary classification that classifies the top-8 
investment banks as top-tier according to the value of deals advised, Golubov, Petmezas, and 
Travlos (2012) document a significantly positive relation between advisor reputation and advisory 
fees.  To examine whether advisors’ industry expertise has any impact on advisory fees (in addition 
to the effect of advisors’ overall reputation), we augment the advisory fee model of Golubov, 
Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) by including our key variables of interest, namely banks’ expertise 
in both acquirers’ and targets’ industries, and the bank-industry rival relationship.     
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The dependent variable, advisory fee, is measured as the natural logarithm of advisory fees 
paid to advisors (McLaughlin (1990, 1992)).21  Note that our empirical analysis is conditional on 
firms disclosing the information of advisory fees and having non-missing values for variables in 
fee regressions.  Thus the numbers of observations are reduced to 1,652 for acquires and 2,705 for 
targets.22  To capture advisor’s overall reputation, we follow Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 
(2012) by including a top-tier advisor dummy, which is equal to one if the advisor is from the top 
eight investment banks listed in Table 2, and zero otherwise.  Furthermore, we control for a set of 
explanatory variables that have been shown by previous studies to affect advisory fees (e.g., 
Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012)).  These are the natural logarithm of transaction value, size 
of transaction relative to the acquirer’s market capitalization, and five dummy variables for tender 
offers, conglomerate mergers, hostile takeovers, mergers involving public targets, and pure-cash 
deals. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 report the OLS regressions results for advisory fees paid by 
acquirers and targets, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the results from Tobit models to account 
for the fact that advisory fee is strictly bounded above zero.  Nevertheless, the results are 
qualitatively similar across the two estimation methods.  Consistent with Golubov, Petmezas, and 
                                                 
21 Robustness checks (untabulated) suggest that similar results are obtained if we deflate the total fees by the deal value 
or use the natural logarithm of the fees to deal value ratio. 
22 There are at least two reasons for advisory fees to be missing in SDC datasets:  (1) no advisor is hired, in which case 
the fee is actually zero; (2) an advisor is actually hired but the fee is not disclosed.  We are not concerned about case 
(1) since firms with no advisor are removed from our sample in the first place.  However, our sample contains many 
transactions in which advisors are hired but fees are not disclosed (case (2)).  For the acquirer’s (target’s) advisory fee 
regression, only 2,012 (4,145) transactions have advisory fees reported.  Ignoring case (2) may give rise to selection 
issues.  In other words, if any hidden factors that determine the disclosure of advisory fees are correlated with the 
hidden factors that determine the level of fees, an OLS estimation of advisory fees is biased.  To tackle this problem, 
ideally we should use the Heckman’s two-stage estimation method, which explicitly models the disclosure of advisory 
fees in the first stage model and estimate the advisory fee model in the second stage.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
find variables explaining the first stage decision - the decision to disclose fees or not in SDC. Our results in Table 6 
thus should be interpreted with caution.  To the extent that the decision to disclose advisory fees is related to the level 
of fees, the estimated coefficients in Table 6 can be biased.   
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Travlos (2012), we document that top-tier advisors charge premium fees for their services. More 
importantly, after controlling for the impact of overall advisor reputation, we find that acquirers 
pay a premium for advisors’ expertise in both acquirers’ (t-statistics = 2.1) and targets’ (t-statistics 
= 2.2) industries (column 1). The result suggests that acquirers value advisors’ industry merger 
expertise and pay a fee premium for it.  A one-standard-deviation increase in expertise in 
acquirers’/targets’ industries (0.098) increases the advisory fee by $1.05/$1.06 million for 
acquirers, which is economically significant given that the mean advisory fee is $4.469 million for 
acquirers.  On the other hand, targets pay a premium for advisors’ expertise in targets’ (t-statistics 
= 3.5) industries only (column 2). A one-standard-deviation increase in expertise in targets’ 
industries (0.098) increases the advisory fee by $1.04 million for targets, which is economically 
significant given that the mean advisory fee is $4.499 million for targets. 
Advisors’ prior relationship with industry rivals have a negative effect on advisory fees, 
implying that firms pay discounted fees to advisors who advised industry rivals because of the 
concern of information leakage.  However, this effect is statistically insignificant (t-statistics = -
1.4 and -1.6 for acquirers and targets, respectively).  Not surprisingly, we document that the amount 
of advisory fees increases with the size of transaction.  In addition, firms are found to pay 
significantly higher fees in tender offers, perhaps reflecting the greater difficulty and longer time 
taken in completing tender offers.  Finally, target’s advisory fee is also higher when the target 
receives cash in acquisitions.   
 
D. Effects of Advisor’s Industry Expertise on Deal Completion and Shareholders’ Value 
Our results so far suggest that advisors’ industry expertise is an important factor in advisor 
choice and firms pay a significant fee premium for it.  We now explore what, if any, benefits accrue 
to the firms from hiring such advisors.   
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Section II outlines two views regarding the impact of advisors’ industry expertise on the 
quality of advisory services.  The “value enhancement” view predicts that advisors’ industry 
expertise should be positively associated with their clients’ shareholder value in acquisitions.  In 
contrast, the “deal completion” view mainly predicts that there should be a positive relation 
between advisors’ industry expertise and the probability of deal completion.  While the two 
hypotheses are not entirely mutually exclusive, we evaluate their relative importance by examining 
the effects of advisors’ industry expertise on various aspects of M&A transactions using regression 
analysis. 
The dependent variables in our regression analysis include three-day [-1, +1] cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) around the acquisition announcement date,  merger premium, acquirer’s 
post-merger stock returns, likelihood of deal completion, and the time to resolution of transaction.23  
For independent variables, in addition to  bank’s industry expertise, Bank’s expertise in merger 
counterparty’s industry × Diversifying, bank-industry rival relationship, and the top-tier advisor 
dummy, we include control variables employed in previous studies (e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz (2004), Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012), and 
Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012)).  The results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. 
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 here] 
 Table 7 shows that there is no significant effect of advisors’ industry expertise on 
shareholders’ value of acquirers and targets.  In regressions, bank’s industry expertise, Bank’s 
expertise in merger counterparty’s industry × Diversifying, and bank-industry rival relationship 
do not significantly affect CARs, deal premium, and the acquirer’s post-merger stock returns.24    
                                                 
23 Post-merger stock returns are defined as three-year buy-and-hold stock returns (BHR) after the effective date minus 
one. 
24 Moreover, we follow the approaches in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) and Powell and Stark (2005) to further 
our analysis on operating performance. For the performance measure, we choose operating income scaled by sales. 
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In contrast, in support of the “deal completion” view, Table 8 shows that the industry 
expertise of advisors hired by acquirers is positively associated with the likelihood of deal 
completion.  Column 1 reports the Probit regression analysis for the probability of deal completion.  
The marginal effects at the mean are reported. The dependent variable, deal completion, equals one 
for completed transactions, and zero for withdrawn deals.  Consistent with Golubov, Petmezas, and 
Travlos (2012), we find that advisor reputation, measured by the top-tier advisor dummy, has no 
effect on deal completion.  However, industry expertise of advisors hired by acquirers has a positive 
and significant impact on the probability of deal completion (z-statistics = 2.8) for expertise in the 
acquirer’s industry, as well as for expertise in the target’s industry (z-statistics = 2.2).  The 
economic magnitude is that a one-standard-deviation increase in acquirer’s industry expertise 
(0.098) is associated with an increase in the probability of deal completion by 0.007 (= 0.098 × 
0.07), where the unconditional probability of completion is 0.913.  Similarly, a one-standard-
deviation increase in target’s industry expertise is associated with an increase in the probability of 
deal completion by 0.009.  The coefficient of bank-industry rival relationship is negative but 
statistically insignificant (z-statistic = -0.9), indicating that while advisors’ relationship with 
industry rivals heightens the concern of information leakage, it does not impede advisors’ 
capability to complete the deal.  As an additional test (untabulated), we include in the regression 
bank’s industry expertise and bank-industry rival relationship for target firms, but find no evidence 
suggesting that they affect the likelihood of deal completion.  Column 2 reports the result of OLS 
regression analysis for time to resolution.  However, neither industry expertise nor bank-industry 
rival relationship has significant impact on the time to resolution. 
                                                 
We estimate the change in this performance measure by comparing the combined performance of the target and 
acquirer in the year prior to the merger transaction with the performance of the acquirer in the years after the takeover. 
The changes are industry-adjusted.  However, we do not find any significant relation between advisors’ industry 
expertise and the change in operating performance.  
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Finally, we re-examine all the preceding results by augmenting the models by including 
variables that measure banks’ industry expertise, bank-industry rival relationship, and bank-firm 
relationship based on whether a bank provided underwriting services in the five years prior to the 
merger.  It is possible that our proxies for expertise and relationship based on M&A activities may 
actually be capturing expertise and relationship acquired from other corporate finance activities 
such as securities underwriting.  By including relationship measures that capture previous 
interactions both in the mergers as well as in underwriting, we aim to demonstrate the effect of 
relationship between banks and sample firms due to M&A activity. Our results (untabulated) show 
that firms are more likely to choose banks with industry underwriting experience.  However, and 
perhaps more importantly, after controlling for all underwriting-based variables, our main results 
with the merger-based variables remain qualitatively unchanged.  Further analysis also reveals that 
underwriting-based variables have no significant impact on advisory fees and the probability of 
completion. These findings suggest that when firms undertake mergers, they ascribe significant 
value to banks’ past expertise in takeovers, which is more relevant than expertise in underwriting 
activities.   
 
V. Conclusions 
This study investigates the impact of merger advisors’ industry expertise and concerns 
about information leakage to product-market rivals on firms’ choice of financial advisors in 
mergers and acquisitions.  We argue that advisors’ industry expertise is a double-edged sword.  
While a bank’s experience in mergers is valuable to its clients, its clients are also concerned about 
potential leakage of information (Calomiris and Singer, 2004; Asker and Ljungavist, 2010) when 
the bank conducts businesses with other firms.  This paper explores the interactions of these factors 
and concerns by examining the acquirers’ and targets’ choices of financial advisors and their 
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decisions to switch advisors between consecutive completed transactions.  It also explores the 
influence of these factors on value, advisory fee, probability of deal completion, and time to 
resolution as associated with these transactions.   
We find that advisors’ industry merger expertise is a strong determinant of firms’ advisor 
choice.  Firms value advisors’ expertise not only in their own industries but also in their 
counterparties’ industries.  The above effect is stronger when the firms in M&A are less informed 
about each other, and when a transaction is more complicated – a transaction involving similar 
sized firms, a target with poison pills in place, and a termination fee.  This overall result persists 
even after controlling for banks’ prior relationships with firms and overall market share, and 
therefore identifies industry expertise as a new factor (previously unidentified in the literature) that 
significantly affects the choice of advisors in mergers and acquisitions.   
However, a bank’s industry expertise also heightens its clients’ concern about information 
leakage to product-market rivals and they avoid sharing advisors with their rivals.  This finding is 
further supported by results of investigation of acquirers’ and targets’ advisor switching decision 
between consecutive completed transactions.  In particular, acquirers are more likely to switch 
away from advisors who have relationships with major industry rivals.  Finally, both acquirers and 
targets pay higher fees if their advisors have more industry expertise, but targets only pay premium 
fees for advisors’ expertise in their own industries.  The higher fees probably reflect banks’ ability 
to leverage their industry expertise to complete M&A deals, and this notion is supported by our 
analysis of the probability of deal completion. However, we find no evidence indicating that 
advisors’ industry merger expertise is associated with value creation for target and acquiring firms.  
Our analysis offers interesting insights into the effects of industry expertise and information 
leakage concerns on the choice of financial advisors.  Our findings represent important advances 
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in understanding the causes of choosing merger advisors from the perspectives of acquirers and 
targets and add to the overall understanding of the roles played by investment banks in mergers. 
34 
 
References  
 
Ai, C. and E.C. Norton (2003), ‘Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models’, Economics Letter, 
Vol. 80, pp. 123-129. 
Anand, B.N. and A. Galetovic (2000), ‘Information, Nonexcludability, and Financial Market 
Structure’, Journal of Business, Vol. 73, pp. 357-402. 
Asker, J. and A. Ljungqvist (2010), ‘Competition and the Structure of Vertical Relationships in 
Capital Markets’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 118, pp. 599-647. 
Azoulay, P. (2004), ‘Capturing Knowledge within and across Firm Boundaries: Evidence from 
Clinical Development’, American Economic Review, Vol. 94, pp. 1591-1612. 
Baccara, M. (2007), ‘Outsourcing, Information Leakage, and Consulting Firms’, Rand Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 38, pp. 269-289. 
Baccara, M. and R. Razin (2004), ‘From Thought to Practice: Appropriation and Endogenous 
Market Structure with Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights’, CEPR Discussion Papers. 
Bao, J. and A. Edmans (2011), ‘Do Investment Banks Matter for M&A Returns?’, Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 24, pp. 2286-2315. 
Bates, T.W. and M.L. Lemmon (2003), ‘Breaking up Is Hard to Do? An Analysis of Termination 
Fee Provisions and Merger Outcomes’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 69, pp. 469-
504. 
Bates, T.W., M.L. Lemmon and J.S. Linck (2006), ‘Shareholder Wealth Effects and Bid Negotiation 
in Freeze-out Deals: Are Minority Shareholders Left out in the Cold?’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 81, pp. 681-708. 
Benveniste, L.M., W.Y. Busaba and W.J. Wilhelm (2002), ‘Information Externalities and the Role 
of Underwriters in Primary Equity Markets’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 11, 
pp. 61-86. 
Benveniste, L.M., A. Ljungqvist, W.J. Wilhelm Jr and X. Yu (2003), ‘Evidence of Information 
Spillovers in the Production of Investment Banking Services’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, 
pp. 577-608. 
Bodnaruk, A., M. Massa and A. Simonov (2009), ‘Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market 
for Corporate Control’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, pp. 4989-5026. 
Buis, M.L. (2010), ‘Interpretation of Interactions in Nonlinear Models’, The Stata Journal, Vol. 10, 
pp. 305-308. 
Calomiris, C.W. and H.J. Singer (2004), ‘How Often Do 'Conflicts of Interests' in the Investment 
Banking Industry Arise During Hostile Takeovers?’, Columbia University, Working Paper. 
Chemmanur, T.J. and P. Fulghieri (1994), ‘Investment Bank Reputation, Information Production, 
and Financial Intermediation’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 49, pp. 57-79. 
Coates, J.C. (2012), ‘Allocating Risk through Contract: Evidence from M&a and Policy 
Implications’, Harvard Law School, Working Paper. 
Corwin, S.A. and P. Schultz (2005), ‘The Role of Ipo Underwriting Syndicates: Pricing, 
Information Production, and Underwriter Competition’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 60, pp. 
443-486. 
Custódio, C. and D. Metzger (2013), ‘How Do Ceos Matter? The Effect of Industry Expertise on 
Acquisition Returns’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 26, pp. 2007-2047. 
Ertugrul, M. and K. Krishnan (2011), ‘Advisor Skill and Acquisition Performance: Do Investment 
Bankers Make a Difference?’,  Northeastern University, Working Paper.  
Golubov, A., D. Petmezas and N.G. Travlos (2012), ‘When It Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker: 
35 
 
New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 67, 
pp. 271-312. 
Harford, J., M. Humphery-Jenner and R. Powell (2012), ‘The Sources of Value Destruction in 
Acquisitions by Entrenched Managers’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 106, pp. 247-
261. 
Healy, P., K. Palepu and R. Ruback (1992), ‘Does Corporate Performance Improve after Mergers?’, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 31, pp. 135-175. 
Heron, R.A. and E. Lie (2006), ‘On the Use of Poison Pills and Defensive Payouts by Takeover 
Targets’, The Journal of Business, Vol. 79, pp. 1783-1807. 
James, C. (1992), ‘Relationship-Specific Assets and the Pricing of Underwriter Services’, Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 47, pp. 1865-1885. 
Kadan, O., L. Madureira, R. Wang and T. Zach (2012), ‘Analysts' Industry Expertise’, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 54, pp. 95-120. 
Kale, J.R., O. Kini and H.E. Ryan Jr (2003), ‘Financial Advisors and Shareholder Wealth Gains in 
Corporate Takeovers’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 38, pp. 475-
501. 
King, G. and L. Zeng (2001), ‘Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data’, Political analysis, Vol. 9, 
pp. 137-163. 
Kolasinski, A.C. and S.P. Kothari (2008), ‘Investment Banking and Analyst Objectivity: Evidence 
from Analysts Affiliated with Mergers and Acquisitions Advisors’, Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 43, pp. 817-842. 
Kolasinski, A.C. and A.F. Siegel (2010), ‘On the Economic Meaning of Interaction Term 
Coefficients in Non-linear Binary Response Regression Models’, University of Washington, 
Working Paper. 
Ljungqvist, A., F. Marston and W.J. Wilhelm Jr (2006), ‘Competing for Securities Underwriting 
Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 
61, pp. 301-340. 
─── (2009), ‘Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-
Management Appointments’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, pp. 3978-4007. 
Macias, A.J. and T. Moeller (2013), ‘Signaling and Risk Allocation in Merger Agreements’, Texas 
Christian University, Working Paper. 
Masulis, R.W., C. Wang and F. Xie (2007), ‘Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns’, Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 62, pp. 1851-1889. 
McFadden, D. (1973), Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior. in P. Zaremka 
(ed), Frontiers in Econometrics. (Academic Press, New York). 
McLaughlin, R.M. (1990), ‘Investment-Banking Contracts in Tender Offers:: An Empirical 
Analysis’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 28, pp. 209-232. 
─── (1992), ‘Does the Form of Compensation Matter?: Investment Banker Fee Contracts in 
Tender Offers’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 223-260. 
Mkrtchyan, A. (2012), ‘The Effect of Director Expertise on Acquisition Performance’, 
Pennsylvania State University, Working Paper. 
Moeller, S.B., F.P. Schlingemann and R.M. Stulz (2004), ‘Firm Size and the Gains from 
Acquisitions’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 73, pp. 201-228. 
Morrison, A.D., A. Thegeya, C. Schenone and W.J. Wilhelm (2013), ‘Investment-Banking 
Relationships: 1933-2007’, University of Oxford, Working Paper. 
Officer, M.S. (2003), ‘Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 69, pp. 431-467. 
36 
 
Powell, R.G. and A.W. Stark (2005), ‘Does Operating Performance Increase Post-Takeover for Uk 
Takeovers? A Comparison of Performance Measures and Benchmarks’, Journal of 
Corporate Finance, Vol. 11, pp. 293-317. 
Rajan, R.G. and L. Zingales (2001), ‘The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins 
and Growth of Firms’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, pp. 805-851. 
Rau, P.R. and T. Vermaelen (1998), ‘Glamour, Value and the Post-Acquisition Performance of 
Acquiring Firms’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 49, pp. 223-253. 
Servaes, H. and M. Zenner (1996), ‘The Role of Investment Banks in Acquisitions’, Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 9, pp. 787. 
Song, W., J. Wei and L. Zhou (2013), ‘The Value of “Boutique” Financial Advisors in Mergers and 
Acquisitions’, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 20, pp. 94-114. 
Zabojnik, J. (2002), ‘A Theory of Trade Secrets in Firms’, International Economic Review, Vol. 43, 
pp. 831-855. 
37 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of M&A Transactions  
The merger and acquisition data is obtained from Thomson Financial’s SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. The 
sample includes 12,996 mergers and acquisitions announced between 1985 and 2008, in which either the acquirer or 
the target employs at least one advisor from the list in Appendix A.  An acquisition is defined as a diversifying 
(horizontal) one if the acquirer and target have different (the same) 4-digit SIC codes reported by SDC. 
 
 
 
Deal characteristics No. of transactions % of the sample 
   
Method of offer   
  Pure cash  4,158 32.0 
  Pure stock 3,267 25.1 
  Others, or combination of cash and stock 5,571 42.9 
Attitude   
  Friendly 12,441 95.7 
  Hostile or unsolicited 506 3.9 
  Undefined 49 0.4 
Status of acquirer and target   
  Public acquirer 11,466 88.2 
  Public target 6,117 47.1 
  Public acquirer and public target 4,658 35.8 
Industry relatedness   
  Horizontal  4,383 33.7 
  Diversifying 8,613 66.3 
Deal status   
  Completed  1,1860 91.3 
  Withdrawn 1,136 8.7 
Number of acquirer’s financial advisors   
  0 4,847 37.3 
  1 7,189 55.3 
  2 810 6.2 
  3 114 0.9 
  4+ 36 0.3 
Number of target’s financial advisors   
  0 2,418 18.6 
  1 9,273 71.4 
  2 1,144 8.8 
  3 138 1.1 
  4+ 23 0.2 
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Table 2: Most Active Advisors in M&A over the Period 1985-2008  
This table presents the market shares of the twenty five most active financial advisors over the period 1985-2008. 
Transaction value is in US$ billion.  Column (1) reports the total value of all mergers advised by the bank and its 
predecessors.  Column (3) reports the total number of all mergers advised by the bank and its predecessors.  Column 
(2) reports the total transaction value of an advisor as a percentage of total transaction values of all advisors.  Column 
(4) reports the total number of transactions advised by a bank as a percentage of the total number of deals done by all 
advisors.  If there is more than one bank advising the acquirer/target in a transaction, each participating bank will get 
1/n share of deal value or 1/n of the count, where n is the number of advisers.  Bidders’ and targets’ advisors are 
counted separately.  Therefore, if both the acquirer and the target of a transaction use advisors, the total number of 
counts is two for the transaction. 
 
Surviving bank (1) 
Transaction 
value ($billion) 
(2) 
% of total 
value 
(3)  
No. of  
deals 
(4)  
% of total 
counts 
Top-Tier     
Goldman Sachs 2,907 15.9 1,538 8.2 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch 2,422 13.2 1,954 10.4 
Morgan Stanley  2,150 11.7 1,279 6.8 
JP Morgan 2,083 11.4 1,461 7.8 
Credit Suisse 1,783 9.7 1,806 9.6 
Citigroup 1,739 9.5 1,414 7.5 
Lehman Brothers (now Barclays Capital) 1,167 6.4 950 5.1 
UBS 819 4.5 1,000 5.3 
     
Non-Top-Tier      
Lazard 725 4.0 396 2.1 
Deutsche Bank 335 1.8 660 3.5 
Dresdner Bank (now Commerzbank) 270 1.5 153 0.8 
Wachovia (now Wells Fargo) 184 1.0 456 2.4 
Houlihan Lokey 132 0.7 375 2.0 
Evercore Partners 126 0.7 46 0.2 
Drexel Burnham Lambert 117 0.6 210 1.1 
Keefe, Bruyette and Woods 104 0.6 436 2.3 
Allen & Company 96 0.5 52 0.3 
Blackstone 92 0.5 45 0.2 
Sandler O'Neill Partners 86 0.5 322 1.7 
Jefferies 85 0.5 462 2.5 
Thomas Weisel Partners 81 0.4 92 0.5 
Greenhill 73 0.4 38 0.2 
Oppenheimer Holdings 73 0.4 235 1.3 
Rothschild 71 0.4 66 0.4 
Peter J Solomon 58 0.3 94 0.5 
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Table 3: Conditional Logit Models Explaining Acquirer’s and Target’s Advisor Choices 
We model the probability that a bank is chosen as a financial advisor by acquirers and targets over the period 1985-
2008.  Columns 1 reports the result from conditional logit model for the outcome between being chosen as an 
acquirer’s advisor or not. Columns 2 reports the result from conditional logit model for the outcome between being 
chosen as a target’s advisor or not. For the acquirer’s (target’s) advisor choice regression, only transactions in which 
the acquirer (target) employs at least one advisor from the list in Appendix A are included.  Bank’s industry expertise 
is defined as the number of M&As advised by a bank for a firm’s industry divided by the total number of M&As in 
the firm’s industry in past 5 years. Bank’s expertise in merger counterparty’s industry is defined as the number of 
M&As advised by a bank for a firm’s counterparty industry divided by the total number of M&As in the firm’s 
counterparty industry in past 5 years. An acquisition is defined as a diversifying one if the acquirer and target have 
different 4-digit SIC codes. Bank-industry rival relationship is defined as the number of M&As advised by a bank for 
a firm’s industry rival (largest three firms ranked by Compustat net sales, excluding the firm itself) divided by the 
total number of M&As in the firm’s industry in the previous five years.  Bank-firm prior relationship is defined as the 
number of mergers advised by a bank for the acquirer (target) divided by the total number of M&As done by an 
acquirer (target) during the past five years. Bank’s market share is defined as the number of M&As advised by a bank 
divided by the total number of M&As in the previous calendar year.  Relative transaction size is the absolute difference 
between the transaction value and the average transaction value of a bank during the past five years.  
Heteroskedasticity-consistent z-statistics are shown in parentheses. We use ***, **, and * to mark coefficients 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) 
Acquirer  
Advisor 
(2) 
Target  
Advisor 
Bank’s industry expertise  4.85*** 5.13*** 
 (26.1) (36.2) 
Bank’s expertise in merger counterparty’s  2.54*** 3.50*** 
  industry  Diversifying (11.7) (16.3) 
Bank- industry rival relationship -2.49*** -2.76*** 
 (-4.8) (-6.0) 
Bank-firm prior relationship 4.14*** 3.44*** 
 (72.2) (44.7) 
Bank’s market share  37.54*** 38.09*** 
 (71.1) (85.6) 
Ln(Relative transaction size) -0.04*** -0.12*** 
 (-4.3) (-16.7) 
Number of Deals 7,797 10,033 
Observations 553,487 707,841 
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.15 
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Table 4: Firm Characteristics, Deal Characteristics and the Impact of Industry Expertise on Merger Advisor Choice 
Panel A reports the results from conditional logit models for the outcome between being chosen as an acquirer’s advisor or not.  Panel B reports the results from 
conditional logit models for the outcome between being chosen as a target’s advisor or not.  Bank’s industry expertise is defined as the number of M&As advised 
by a bank for a firm’s industry divided by the total number of M&As in the firm’s industry in past 5 years. Bank’s expertise in merger counterparty’s industry is 
defined as the number of M&As advised by a bank for a firm’s counterparty industry divided by the total number of M&As in the firm’s counterparty industry in 
past 5 years. An acquisition is defined as a diversifying one if the acquirer and target have different 4-digit SIC codes. Bank-industry rival relationship is defined 
as the number of M&As advised by a bank for a firm’s industry rival (largest three firms ranked by Compustat net sales, excluding the firm itself) divided by the 
total number of M&As in the firm’s industry in the previous five years.  Industry expertise is interacted with six variables (Z) as follows.  Merger-of-equals dummy 
is defined by the SDC indicating similar pre-merger market values of the two companies. Intangible assets is defined as the percentage of intangible assets to total 
assets. R&D intensity is defined as the percentage of R&D expense to total assets. Tobin’s Q is the market value of assets over book value of assets. Poison pill is 
a dummy equal to one if the target invokes a poison pill or the existence or enactment of a poison pill discourages the potential acquirer. Acquirer (Target) 
termination fee dummy is equal to one if the acquirer (target) pays a pre-determined termination fee if it violates the conditions for the transaction.  Other variables 
are defined in Table 3. Heteroskedasticity-consistent z-statistics are shown in parentheses. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Acquirer’s advisor choice 
 
 
 (1) 
Z =  
Merger-of- 
equals 
(2) 
Z =  
Target’s  
intangible assets 
(3) 
Z =  
Target’s  
R&D intensity 
(4) 
Z =  
Target’s  
Tobin’s Q 
(5) 
Z =  
Poison 
 pill 
(6) 
Z =  
Acquirer’s  
termination fee 
Bank’s industry expertise 4.81*** 5.03*** 3.94*** 2.92*** 4.81*** 4.48*** 
 (25.9) (11.3) (14.4) (7.6) (25.9) (21.1) 
Bank’s expertise in merger  2.51*** 3.18*** 1.58*** 1.03* 2.62*** 2.03*** 
counterparty’s industry Diversifying (11.4) (6.2) (4.9) (1.8) (11.9) (7.1) 
Z  Bank's industry expertise 3.38** 3.04*** 9.49*** 0.71*** 18.65* 1.21*** 
 (2.0) (2.8) (2.6) (4.2) (1.9) (3.4) 
Z  Bank’s expertise in merger 12.85** 4.20*** 29.55*** 0.78** 3.74** 1.29*** 
counterparty’s industry Diversifying (2.2) (2.9) (3.4) (2.2) (2.0) (2.9) 
Bank- industry rival relationship -2.48*** -1.50** -1.56** -1.33* -2.47*** -2.37*** 
 (-4.7) (-2.0) (-2.1) (-1.8) (-4.7) (-4.5) 
Bank-firm prior relationship 4.14*** 4.10*** 4.10*** 4.11*** 4.14*** 4.14*** 
 (72.1) (46.8) (47.9) (47.1) (72.1) (72.1) 
Bank’s market share 37.49*** 41.13*** 41.24*** 41.19*** 37.52*** 37.55*** 
 (71.0) (56.1) (57.4) (56.2) (71.0) (71.1) 
Log(Relative transaction size) -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
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 (-4.2) (-5.1) (-5.8) (-5.6) (-4.3) (-4.2) 
Number of Deals 7,797 3,544 3,696 3,566 7,797 7,797 
Observations 553,487 249,418 260,430 251,373 553,487 553,487 
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21 
 
Panel B: Target’s advisor choice 
 
 
 (1) 
Z =  
Merger-of- 
equals 
(2) 
Z =  
Acquirer’s  
intangible assets 
(3) 
Z =  
Acquirer’s  
R&D intensity 
(4) 
Z =  
Acquirer’s  
Tobin’s Q 
(5) 
Z =  
Poison 
 pill 
(6) 
Z =  
Target’s  
termination fee 
Bank’s industry expertise 5.11*** 6.87*** 5.25*** 2.50*** 5.10*** 4.64*** 
 (36.0) (26.2) (32.3) (9.5) (35.9) (30.0) 
Bank’s expertise in merger  3.46*** 5.24*** 3.17*** 1.89*** 3.61*** 2.97*** 
counterparty’s industry Diversifying (16.0) (12.2) (12.5) (4.4) (16.5) (11.3) 
Z  Bank's industry expertise 3.81** 4.75*** 17.52*** 1.84*** 3.94** 2.29*** 
 (2.5) (7.4) (6.5) (13.1) (2.5) (7.4) 
Z  Bank’s expertise in merger 15.56* 5.69*** 35.47*** 1.24*** 3.45** 1.46*** 
counterparty’s industry Diversifying (1.9) (4.5) (4.2) (4.6) (2.2) (3.2) 
Bank- industry rival relationship -2.80*** -3.17*** -3.25*** -3.16*** -2.81*** -3.04*** 
 (-6.0) (-6.1) (-6.3) (-5.9) (-6.0) (-6.4) 
Bank-firm prior relationship 3.43*** 3.42*** 3.44*** 3.40*** 3.43*** 3.39*** 
 (44.6) (39.2) (39.9) (39.1) (44.6) (43.9) 
Bank’s market share 38.06*** 38.69*** 38.63*** 38.32*** 38.04*** 38.04*** 
 (85.5) (77.5) (78.9) (76.9) (85.4) (85.6) 
Log(Relative transaction size) -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (-16.6) (-15.6) (-16.3) (-15.3) (-16.6) (-16.4) 
Number of Deals 10,033 8,223 8,588 8,239 10,033 10,033 
Observations 707,841 585,505 612,271 587,357 707,841 707,841 
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
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Table 5: Advisor Switching Decisions for Acquirers and Target Firms 
We estimate the probability that acquirers and targets switch away from their prior banks in consecutive M&A deals. 
We define a switch if a firm does not hire advisors from its most recent deal (or, if ex-advisors have been acquired, 
their successors). If multiple advisors were hired in the previous deal, we define a switch if the firm does not retain 
every advisor from the previous deal. Bank's industry expertise for an acquirer (a target) is defined as an advisor’s 
share of the acquirer (target) industry’s merger transactions during the past five years. Bank’s expertise in merger 
counterparty’s industry is defined as the number of M&As advised by a bank for a firm’s counterparty industry divided 
by the total number of M&As in the firm’s counterparty industry in past 5 years. An acquisition is defined as a 
diversifying one if the acquirer and target have different 4-digit SIC codes. Bank-industry rival relationship is defined 
as the number of M&As advised by a bank for a firm’s industry rivals (largest three firms ranked by Compustat net 
sales, excluding the firm itself) divided by the total number of M&As in the firm’s industry in previous 5 years. Bank-
firm relationship is defined as an advisor’s share of the firm’s merger transactions during the past five years. Bank's 
market share is an advisor’s market share of merger activity in the calendar year prior to the current deal in 
consideration.  Loyalty index measures how often an advisor retains its client firms in consecutive M&A deals.  Let 
Ick and Irk = 1 if an advisor j advisor firm k’s penultimate and the most recent M&A transactions, respectively, in the 
past five years, and zero otherwise, then advisor j’s loyalty index is set equal to Σk (Ick× Irk) / Σk Ick , which represents 
the number of retained clients over the total number of clients.  Bank-merger dummy indicates whether the previous 
financial advisor itself has involved in any bank mergers since the previous deal. Robust z-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Acquirer’s advisor  
switching decision 
Target’s advisor  
switching decision 
Bank’s industry expertise -0.74** -0.10 
 (-2.5) (-0.3) 
Bank’s expertise in merger  -1.35** -0.52 
counterparty’s industry  Diversifying (-2.4) (-0.5) 
Bank-industry rival relationship 6.56** -0.84 
 (2.1) (-0.3) 
Bank-firm prior relationship -0.66*** -0.33** 
 (-7.2) (-2.0) 
Bank’s market share -1.05 -6.37*** 
 (-0.8) (-3.2) 
Loyalty index -1.04*** -1.23*** 
 (-4.9) (-3.8) 
Bank-merger dummy 0.30** 0.02 
 (2.4) (0.1) 
Ln(1 + the number of years since the 0.53*** 0.92*** 
previous transaction) (8.2) (9.5) 
Constant 0.59*** 0.24 
 (5.9) (1.3) 
Number of Observations 2,231 920 
Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.11 
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Table 6: Financial Advisory Fees for Acquirers and Target Firms  
The columns 1 and 2 of the table present results of the OLS regression analysis of advisory fees and the dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of advisory fees paid by firms to the advisors. The columns 3 and 4 present results of 
the Tobit regression analysis and the dependent variable is the level of advisory fees paid by firms to the advisors.  
Bank’s industry expertise is defined as the number of M&As advised by a bank for a firm’s industry divided by the 
total number of M&As in the firm’s industry in past 5 years. Bank’s expertise in merger counterparty’s industry is 
defined as the number of M&As advised by a bank for a firm’s counterparty industry divided by the total number of 
M&As in the firm’s counterparty industry in past 5 years. An acquisition is defined as a diversifying one if the acquirer 
and target have different 4-digit SIC codes. Bank-industry rival relationship is defined as the number of M&As 
advised by a bank for a firm’s industry rival (largest three firms ranked by Compustat net sales, excluding the firm 
itself) divided by the total number of M&As in the firm’s industry in the previous five years. For the above three bank-
related variables, we sum up the values across advisors involved if there are multiple advisors in one deal. Top-tier is 
a dummy variable and it equals one if the firm retains a top-tier advisor, and zero otherwise. Relative size is defined 
as the transaction value divided by acquirer’s market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Tender offer, Hostility, Public target, and Pure-Cash deals are dummy variables and other variables 
are self-explanatory. Constant terms, year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects are included but not reported. The 
t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich heteroskedastic consistent errors, which are 
also corrected for correlation across observations for a given deal.  The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
 
 
 (1) 
Acquirer’s 
Advisory Fee 
OLS 
(2) 
Target’s 
Advisory Fee 
OLS 
(3) 
Acquirer’s 
Advisory Fee 
Tobit 
(4) 
Target’s 
Advisory Fee 
Tobit 
Bank's industry expertise  0.50** 0.47*** 1.10** 0.74** 
   (2.1) (3.5) (2.1) (2.0) 
Bank’s expertise in merger  0.55** 0.06 1.23** -0.09 
counterparty’s industryDiversifying (2.2) (0.4) (2.4) (-0.2) 
Bank-industry rival relationship -1.22 -0.48 -0.65 0.72 
 (-1.4) (-1.6) (-0.3) (0.6) 
Top-tier Advisor 0.40*** 0.33*** 0.11 0.46*** 
 (6.9) (8.9) (0.9) (5.1) 
Ln (Transaction size) 0.65*** 0.67*** 1.53*** 1.66*** 
 (38.7) (54.8) (41.3) (60.4) 
Tender offer 0.31*** 0.12** 0.11 -0.08 
 (3.1) (2.5) (0.6) (-0.7) 
Relative size -0.02 -0.05** -0.04 -0.07 
 (-0.6) (-2.5) (-0.9) (-1.6) 
Diversifying -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.01 
 (-0.8) (0.9) (-0.1) (0.2) 
Hostility -0.05 0.10 0.36 0.63*** 
 (-0.4) (1.0) (1.5) (2.9) 
Public target -0.02 0.04 -0.45*** -0.42*** 
 (-0.3) (0.2) (-2.7) (-3.3) 
Pure-Cash deals 0.06 0.11** 0.10 0.17 
 (0.5) (2.6) (0.5) (1.6) 
Number of deals 1,652 2,705 1,652 2,705 
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.73   
Pseudo R-squared   0.21 0.23 
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Table 7: Advisors’ industry expertise and merger outcomes  
The table presents results of the OLS regression analysis of merger performances for a sample of U.S mergers and 
acquisitions announced over the period 1985 to 2008. The dependent variables are Acquirer’s CAR, Target’s CAR, 
Premium and Post-merger performance, respectively. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is measured from one day 
before to one day after the announcement date. The market model parameters are estimated over the period (-210, -11) 
with the CRSP equally-weighted return as the market index. Premium is measured as the initial offer price (or final price 
if initial price unavailable) as reported by SDC, deflated by the share price of the target at five trading days preceding the 
announcement date, less one. Post-merger performance are defined as three-year buy-and-hold stock returns (BHR) after 
the effective date minus one. Bank’s industry expertise is defined as the number of M&As advised by a bank for a firm’s 
industry divided by the total number of M&As in the firm’s industry in past 5 years. Bank’s expertise in merger 
counterparty’s industry is defined as the number of M&As advised by a bank for a firm’s counterparty industry divided 
by the total number of M&As in the firm’s counterparty industry in past 5 years. An acquisition is defined as a diversifying 
one if the acquirer and target have different 4-digit SIC codes. Bank-industry rival relationship is defined as the number 
of M&As advised by a bank for a firm’s industry rivals divided by the total number of M&As in the firm’s industry in the 
previous five years. For the above three bank-related variables, we sum up the values across advisors involved if there are 
multiple advisors in one deal. Top-tier is a dummy variable and it equals one if the firm retains a top-tier advisor, and 
zero otherwise. Relative size is defined as the transaction value divided by acquirer’s market capitalization at the end of 
the fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement. Leverage is defined as total debt/total assets. Tobin’s Q is the market 
value of assets over book value of assets. Free cash flow is (Net Income + Depreciation - Capital Expenditure)/Assets. 
Run-up is the buy-and-hold abnormal return during the period (-210, -11). The market index is the CRSP value-weighted 
return. Tender offer, Hostility, Public target, and Pure-Cash deals are dummy variables and other variables are self-
explanatory. Constant terms, year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects are included but not reported. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich heteroskedastic consistent errors, which are also corrected for 
correlation across observations for a given deal.  The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.   
 
 
(1) 
Acquirer’s  
CAR 
(2) 
Target’s  
CAR 
(3) 
Premium 
(4) 
Post-merger 
performance 
Bank's industry expertise Acquirer -0.01  -0.08 0.08 
   (-0.8)  (-1.2) (0.2) 
Bank’s expertise in merger  0.01  0.08 0.26 
counterparty’s industryAcquirer Diversifying (1.2)  (0.9) (0.6) 
Bank-industry rival relationshipAcquirer 0.04*  0.15 -0.32 
 (1.7)  (1.3) (-0.9) 
Top-tier AdvisorAcquirer 0.00  -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.7)  (-0.1) (-0.0) 
Bank's industry expertiseTarget   -0.01 0.05 0.36 
    (-0.3) (0.6) (0.9) 
Bank’s expertise in merger   0.01 0.08 0.14 
counterparty’s industryTarget Diversifying  (0.3) (1.0) (0.4) 
Bank-industry rival relationshipTarget  -0.04 -0.01 -0.54 
  (-0.5) (-0.1) (-1.4) 
Top-tier AdvisorTarget  -0.02* -0.01 -0.15** 
  (-1.8) (-1.0) (-2.2) 
Tender offer 0.02*** 0.09*** 0.03** 0.12 
 (6.1) (8.0) (2.6) (1.4) 
Relative size 0.01*** -0.02*** 0.01** 0.08 
 (5.5) (-6.2) (2.3) (0.8) 
Diversifying -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 
 (-0.6) (-0.4) (-0.4) (0.2) 
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Hostile -0.02*** 0.03** 0.00 -0.10 
 (-3.8) (2.2) (0.2) (-1.1) 
Public target -0.04*** -0.00 0.02 0.03 
 (-15.7) (-0.1) (0.3) (0.2) 
Pure-Cash deals 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.04 
 (2.6) (4.6) (1.0) (0.6) 
LeverageAcquirer 0.01**  -0.07** -0.32 
 (2.1)  (-2.0) (-1.0) 
Ln(Assets)Acquirer -0.00***  0.02*** -0.00 
 (-6.0)  (4.1) (-0.1) 
Tobin’s QAcquirer -0.00  0.01*** -0.04* 
 (-0.4)  (4.0) (-1.7) 
CashFlowAcquirer 0.00  0.01 -0.08 
 (0.2)  (0.7) (-0.5) 
Run-upAcquirer -0.01***  0.05*** -0.21** 
 (-4.4)  (4.0) (-2.4) 
LeverageTarget   -0.01 0.07** 0.00 
  (-0.2) (2.2) (0.0) 
Ln(Assets)Target  -0.00 -0.03*** -0.06 
  (-0.7) (-4.9) (-1.6) 
Tobin’s QTarget  -0.01* -0.02*** -0.00 
  (-1.7) (-5.0) (-0.1) 
CashFlowTarget  0.03*** -0.00 -0.02 
  (3.2) (-0.4) (-0.1) 
Run-upTarget  -0.05*** -0.10*** -0.09 
  (-5.7) (-9.9) (-1.2) 
Observations 7,607 2,517 2,029 1,722 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.04 
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Table 8: Acquirer Advisor’s Industry Expertise, Probability of Completion and Time to 
resolution 
The column one presents result of the probit regression analysis of the probability of deal completion for a sample of U.S 
mergers and acquisitions announced over the period 1985 to 2008. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, deal 
completion, which is equal to one for completed transactions, and zero for withdrawn deals. The column two shows the 
result of OLS regression analysis for the time to resolution and the dependent variable is defined as the number of calendar 
days between the announcement and resolution (completion or withdrawal) dates. The definitions of the other variables 
can be found at the legend of table 7. The probit model is estimated and marginal effects at the mean are reported. The z-
statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich heteroskedastic consistent errors, which are also 
corrected for correlation across observations for a given deal.  Constant terms, year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects 
are included but not reported. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
 
 Deal Completion Time to resolution 
Bank's industry expertise acquirer 0.07*** 16.06 
   (2.8) (1.2) 
Bank’s expertise in merger  0.09** 1.56 
counterparty’s industry acquirer Diversifying (2.2) (0.1) 
Bank-industry rival relationship acquirer -0.07 45.32 
 (-0.9) (1.2) 
Top-tier acquirer -0.00 8.50*** 
 (-0.9) (3.4) 
Tender offer 0.03*** -41.31*** 
 (5.5) (-9.1) 
Relative size -0.01*** 11.03*** 
 (-6.9) (7.3) 
Diversifying 0.00 -7.70*** 
 (0.0) (-3.1) 
Hostility -0.57*** 1.05 
 (-19.1) (0.1) 
Public target -0.08*** 53.89*** 
 (-12.1) (17.6) 
Pure-Cash deals 0.00 -17.00*** 
 (0.0) (-6.2) 
Leverage acquirer -0.00 4.31 
 (-0.2) (0.6) 
Ln (Assets) acquirer 0.00* 4.11*** 
 (1.7) (4.4) 
Tobin’s Q acquirer 0.00 -0.34 
 (0.4) (-0.7) 
Free cash flow acquirer 0.01** -0.59 
 (2.2) (-0.3) 
Run-up acquirer 0.02*** -2.42 
 (3.3) (-1.3) 
Number of Deals 7,610 7,610 
R-squared 0.28 0.22 
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Appendix A: Major Bank Mergers in the Banking Industry 
The table summarizes the major merger and acquisition events in the banking industry. The sample banks are selected by forming a union of two groups of banks: (1) the 
sample of Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006); and (2) the sample of 50 most active banks in M&A activities by transaction value over the period 1985 to 2008. The 
effective dates of bank mergers are obtained from Corwin and Schultz (2005), supplemented by other financial news sources.  The numbers in the brackets following bank 
names define the predecessor-successor relationships among banks. The number at the beginning represents the surviving bank. The first subsequent character (a or b) 
represent one of the two predecessors of the surviving bank. The second, third and fourth characters further define the earlier predecessors. For example, Credit Suisse 
First Boston (2a) and Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette (2b) are predecessors of Credit Suisse (2), the surviving bank. Credit Suisse (2aa) and First Boston Corp. (2ab) are 
predecessors of Credit Suisse First Boston (2a). 
 
Surviving Bank Effective 
date 
Bank 1 Bank 2 
Sample bank from Ljungqvist, Martson and Wilhelm (2006) 
Citigroup/Salomon Smith Barney 
(1) 
19860731 Schroders (1aba) Wertheim Holdings (1abb) 
 19971128 Salomon Brothers (1aaba) Smith Barney Inc. (1aabb) 
 19981008 CitiCorp (1aaa) Travelers (1aab) 
 20000501 Salomon Smith Barney Holdings (1aa) Schroders-Worldwide Investment (1ab) 
 20010202 Salomon Smith Barney Holdings (1a) Geneva Companies (1b) 
Credit Suisse (2) 19881222 Credit Suisse (2aa) First Boston Corp. (2ab) 
 20001103 Credit Suisse First Boston (2a) Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette (2b) 
Lehman Brothers (3) 19840510 Shearson/American Express (3aa) Lehman Brothers (3ab) 
(now Barclays Capital) 19880429 Shearson Lehman Brothers (3a) EF Hutton (3b) 
JP Morgan (4) 19920326 Chemical Bank (4aaaaaaa) Manufacturers Hanover Bank (4aaaaaab) 
 19960331 Chemical Bank (4aaaaaa) Chase Manhattan (4aaaaab) 
 19990325 Robert Fleming Hldgs Ltd (4aaaba) Jardine Fleming Group Ltd (4aaabb) 
 19991210 Chase Manhattan Corp. (4aaaaa) Hambrecht & Quist Group (4aaaab) 
 20000411 Chase Manhattan Corp. (4aaaa) Robert Fleming Hldgs Ltd (4aaab) 
 20001231 Chase Manhattan Corp. (4aaa) JP Morgan & Co. (4aab) 
 20040701 JP Morgan Chase & Co. (4aa) Bank One Corp. (4ab) 
 20080530 JP Morgan Chase & Co. (4a)  Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. (4b) 
UBS (5) 19950131 PaineWebber (5baa) Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc.(5bab) 
 19950703 Swiss Bank Corp. (5abaa) SG Warburg Securities (5abab) 
 19970902 SBC Warburg (Swiss Bank Corp.) (5aba) Dillon Read & Co. (5abb) 
 19980629 Union Bank of Switzerland (5aa) Swiss Bank Corp. (5ab) 
 20000612 PaineWebber Group, Inc. (5ba) JC Bradford & Co. (5bb) 
 20001103 UBS AG (5a) Paine Webber Group, Inc. (5b) 
Deutsche Bank (6) 19900330 Deutsche Bank AG (6ba) Morgan Grenfell (6bb) 
 19960801 James D Wolfensohn Inc. (6aba) Bankers Trust New York Corp. (6abb) 
 19970902 Alex Brown, Inc. (6aa) Bankers Trust New York Corp. (6ab) 
 19990604 BT Alex Brown (6a) Deutsche Bank AG (6b) 
Wachovia Corp. (7) 19980202 First Union Corp. (7aaaa) Wheat First Butcher Singer (7aaab) 
(now Wells Fargo) 19990401 Wachovia Corp. (7aaba) Interstate/Johnson Lane (7aabb) 
 19990731 Prudential Securities (7abaa) Vector Securities Intl., Inc. (7abab) 
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 19991231 Prudential Securities (7aba) Volpe Brown Whelan & Co. (7abb) 
 20010904 First Union Corp. (7aaa) Wachovia Corp. (7aab) 
 20030701 Wachovia Corp. (7aa) Prudential Securities (7ab) 
 20071001 Wachovia Corp. (7a) AG Edwards Inc. (7b) 
Oppenheimer Holdings (8) 19890815 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
(8abaa) 
Wood Gundy Inc. (8abab) 
 19971103 CIBC Wood Gundy Securities (8aba) Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.(8abb) 
 20030103 Fahnestock Viner Holdings Inc. (8aa) CIBC Oppenheimer's retail brokerage 
business (the Private Client and U.S. 
Asset Management Divisions) was sold 
(8ab) 
 20080114 Oppenheimer Holdings Inc. (8a) CIBC World Markets-US Businesses (8b) 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch  
(9) 
19920422 BankAmerica Corp. (9aaaaaa) Securities Pacific (9aaaaab) 
 19940901 BankAmerica Corp. (9aaaaa) Continental Bank (9aaaab) 
 19971001 BankAmerica Corp. (9aaaa) Robertson Stephens & Co. (9abbb) 
 19971001 NationsBank Corp. (9aaba) Montgomery Securities (13a) 
 19980202 Fleet Financial Group Inc. (9abaa) Quick & Reilly Group(9abab) 
 19980901  BankBoston Corp.  (9abba) Robertson Stephens & Co. (9abbb) 
 19980930 BankAmerica Corp. (9aaa) NationsBank Corp. (9aab) 
 19991001 Fleet Financial Group Inc. (9aba) BankBoston Corp. (9abb) 
 20040401 BankAmerica Corp. (9aa) FleetBoston Financial (9ab) 
 20061218 Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.(9ba)  Petrie Parkman & Co., Inc.(9bb) 
 20090101 Bank of America Corp. (9a) Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.(9b) 
Morgan Stanley (10) 19970531 Dean Witter Discover & Co. (10a) Morgan Stanley Group, Inc. (10b) 
Cowen Group (11) 19980630 Cowen & Co. (11a) Societe Generale Securities (11b) 
 2006 Cowen carved out  
Goldman Sachs (12)    
Thomas Weisel Partners (13) 19980921 Spun off from Montgomery Securities 
(13a) 
 
Other banks which are classified as the top-50 in SDC by transaction value  
Drexel Burnham Lambert (14) 
Lazard (15)    
Piper Jeffray (16) 19980501 US BanCorp. (16aa) Piper Jaffray Companies (16ab) 
 19990104 US BanCorp. (16a) Libra Investment, Inc. (16b) 
 20031231 US BanCorp. (16x) spun off Piper Jaffray 
(16) 
 
SunTrust Robinson-Humphrey 
(17) 
19980102 SunTrust Banks Inc. (17aa) Equitable Securities Corp. (17ab) 
 20010727 SunTrust Banks Inc. (17a) Robinson-Humphrey (17b) 
Houlihan Lokey (18)    
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ABN-AMRO (19) 19950309 ING (19baa) Barings Securities (19bab) 
 19950927 ABN-AMRO Holding N.V. (19aa) Chicago Corporation (19ab) 
 19971008 ING Barings (19ba) Furman Selz LLC (19bb) 
 20010430 ABN-AMRO Holding N.V. (19a) ING Baring-US Operations (19b) 
Dresdner (20) 19950823 Dresdner Bank AG (20aa) Kleinwort Benson (20ab) 
(now Commerzbank) 20010105 Dresdner Bank AG (20a) Wasserstein Perella Group, Inc. (20b) 
Stephens Inc. (21)    
Greenhill (22)    
Jefferies (23) 20010321 Jefferies & Co. (23aaa) Quarterdeck Investment (23aab) 
 20031223 Jefferies Group Inc. (23aa) Broadview Holdings (23ab) 
 20070621 Jefferies & Co. (23a) Putnam Lovell Group Inc. (23b) 
Blackstone (24)    
EverCore Partners (25)    
Allen & Co. (26)    
RBC Capital Market (27) 19980102 Dain Bosworth (27aabaa) Rauscher Pierce Refsnes (27aabab) 
 19980406 Dain Rauscher Corp. (27aaba) Wessels Arnold & Henderson LLC 
(27aabb) 
 20010110 Royal Bank of Canada (27aaa) Dain Rauscher Corp. (27aab) 
 20011101 Royal Bank of Canada (27aa) Tucker Anthony Sutro (27ab) 
 20070111 RBC Capital Market (27a) Daniels & Associates Inc. (27b) 
Stifel Financial Corp. (28) 20020429 Ryan Beck & Co. (28ba) Gruntal & Co. (28bb) 
 20070228 Stifel Financial Corp. (28a) Ryan Beck & Co. (28b) 
KPMG (29)    
Peter J Solomon (30)    
Raymond James (31) 19980511 First Chicago NBD Corp. (31aaa) Roney & Co. (31aab) 
 19981002 First Chicago NBD Corp. (31aa) BANC ONE Corp. (31ab) 
 19990614 Roney Capital Markets (BANC ONE) 
(31a) 
Raymond James Financial, Inc. (31b) 
William Blair (32)    
PricewaterhouseCoopers (33) 19980701 Price Waterhouse (33a) Coopers & Lybrand LLC (33b) 
Ernst & Young (34)    
Needham & Co. (35)    
Simmons & Co. (36)    
KeyCorp(37) 19980908 McDonald & Co. Investments, Inc. (37aaa) Essex Capital Markets, Inc. (37aab) 
 19981026 McDonald & Co. Investments, Inc. (37aa) KeyCorp(37ab) 
 19990603 McDonald & Co. Investments, Inc. (37a) Trident Financial Corp. (37b) 
Keefe, Bruyette and Woods  (38) 19960508 Keefe, Bruyette and Woods (38a) Charles Webb & Co. (38b) 
Sandler O’Neill Partners (39)    
Alliant Partners (40)    
Austin Associates Inc. (41)    
Robert W Baird & Co. (42)    
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Baxter Fentriss & Co. (43)    
BB&T Corp. (44) 19971002 BB&T Corp. (44aaa) Craigie Inc. (44aab) 
 19990326 BB&T Corp. (44aa) Scott & Stringfellow Financial (44ab) 
 20050105 BB&T Corp. (44a) Windsor Group LLC (44b) 
Berkery, Noyes & Co. (45)    
BMO Capital Markets  (46) 19871031 Bank of Montreal (46a) Nesbitt Thomson Inc. (46b) 
Brown, Gibbons, Lang & Co. (47)    
Duff & Phelps (48)    
Friedman Billings Ramsey  (49)    
Goldsmith Agio Helms & Co. (50)    
Grant Thornton LLP (51)    
Harris Williams & Co. (52)    
Hovde Financial (53)    
Lincoln International (54)    
Morgan Joseph & Co., Inc.(55)    
Morgan Keegan Inc. (56)    
Rothschild (57)    
RSM EquiCo Capital Markets 
(58) 
   
Sperry Mitchell (59)  
Updata Capital Inc. (60) 
   
 
